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Shields: Injection of Contaminated Drug by Hospital Employee Sufficient to

PRODUCTS LIABILITY-Breach of Implied
Warranty-Injection Of Contaminated Drug By Hospital
Employee Sufficient To Constitute Sale of Product for
Purposes of Implied Warranty.
Providence Hospital v. Truly,
611 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ dism'd).
Mrs. Goldie E. Truly underwent cataract surgery at Providence Hospital. At the end of the operation, a contaminated drug supplied by the
hospital's pharmacy was injected into her eye.1 The contamination in-2
jured Mrs. Truly's eye and additional corrective surgery was required.
Truly pleaded an action in negligence for failure of the hospital's nurse or
surgeon to discover the contamination. 3 She also sought damages for
breach of implied warranty under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act."
The jury found the hospital was not negligent.5 The trial court, however,
entered judgment in favor of Truly upon the breach of warranty action.6
The hospital appealed.' Held-Affirmed. Injection of contaminated drug
by hospital employee's sufficient to constitute sale of product for purposes of implied warranty.'
An implied warranty of quality9 is a legal fiction imposed upon a seller
of goods who implicitly represents to buyers that the goods are fit for
their ordinary or particular purpose.10 The implied warranty provides the
1. Providence Hospital v. Truly, 611 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ
dism'd). The injection of Miochol into Truly's eye was the final act of the cataract surgery.
Id. at 129.
2. Id. at 129.
3. Id. at 129.
4. Id. at 129. Truly sought treble damages and attorney's fees provided under the Act.
Id. at 129.
5. Id. at 130.
6. Id. at 130.
7. Id. at 130.
8. Id. at 132-33.
9. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.314, 2.315 (warranties of merchantability and
fitness for a particular purpose).
10. See, e.g., Interstate Folding Box Co. v. Hodge Chile Co., 334 S.W.2d 408, 414 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1960) (no implied warranty by seller concerning quality or fitness of food cartons
when cartons delivered according to buyer's specifications); Deere & Weever Co. v. Moch, 3
N.W.2d 471, 474 (N.D. 1942) (implied warranty imposed upon sale of farm machinery); J. A.
Campbell Co. v. Corley, 13 P.2d 610, 613 (Or. 1932) (implied warranty extends to sale of
unusable flour).
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buyer with a remedy for injuries caused by the product." The warranty is
incorporated into the contract by operation of law when the goods are
sold, regardless of the intent of the parties.1 2 The basis for holding sellers
of goods to an implied warranty is that the law must intercede in order to
regulate a transaction which might otherwise result in hardship to the
buyer.'2 Imposing an implied warranty on a seller of goods has been limited, however, by the degree of the buyer's reliance on the seller's representations.14 If the buyer has an opportunity to inspect the product for
patent defects, he is no longer said to rely on the seller and an implied
warranty does not attach. 5

11. See, e.g., Broyles v. Brown Eng'r Co., 151 So.2d 767, 770 (Ala. 1963) (engineering
company breached implied warranty for adequacy of plans and specifications in absence of
express warranty in contract); Stanfield v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 53 P.2d 878, 880 (Kan.
1936) (purchased food carries implied warranty of fitness for intended purpose in absence of
express warranty); Nettles v. Imperial Distrib., Inc., 159 S.E.2d 206, 215 (W. Va. 1968)
(breach of implied warranty when defective stove exploded). See also Sneed v. Beaverson,
395 P.2d 414, 415-16 (Okla. 1964) (food sold which causes injuries held to implied warranty);
F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Garza, 390 S.W.2d 90, 91 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1956, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (food sold for human consumption held to implied warranty).
12. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 286 N.E.2d 188, 19495 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972) (seller of chickens liable for breach of implied warranty imposed by
operation of law); Chandler v. Anchor Serum Co., 426 P.2d 82, 89 (Kan. 1967) (action in
implied warranty imposed by operation of law against manufacturer, distributor, and retailer of infectious animal vaccine); Mountaineer Contractors, Inc. v. Mountain State Mack,
Inc., 268 S.E.2d 886, 889 (W. Va. 1980) (breach of implied warranty applies by operation of
law to sale of bulldozers for surface mining operations).
13. See Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society: II, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 341,
403 (1937). Implied warranties are also imposed because the seller often has greater ability
to test, evaluate, control, and correct any defects in the product. See Singal, Extending
Implied Warranties Beyond Goods: Protection for Consumers of Services, 12 NEW ENGLAND
L. REV, 859, 878 (1977). The seller is, therefore, said to be in a better position to choose a
product for buyer's purpose than the buyer himself. See U.C.C. § 2-315. Section 2-315 provides:"Where the seller [of goods] at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's
skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is ... an implied warranty that
the goods shall be fit for such purpose." Id.
14. See, e.g., Lanphier Constr. Co. v. Fowco Constr. Co., 523 S.W.2d 29, 41 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (particular purpose as required for implied warranty envisions specific use by buyer); Brown v. Asgrow Seed Co., 379 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (must be justifiable reliance by buyer on
seller's representations before seller held to implied warranty that articles sold are suitable
for purpose intended); Craftsman Glass, Inc. v. Cathey, 351 S.W.2d 950, 952 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1961, no writ) (article sold for special purpose carries implied warranty that
article is suitable for such use).
15. See U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b) (1952 version). Section 2-316, Comment 8 of the UCC
provides:
The particular buyer's skill and the normal method of examining goods in the
circumstances determine what defects are excluded by the examination ....
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Since implied warranties of merchantability and fitness are limited to
the sale of goods,"6 they generally have not been found to attach to the
8 inperformance of a mere service.1" Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital"
volved an action to impose an implied warranty of fitness for the transfusion of blood contaminated with serum hepatitis.' The New Jersey court
held that when service predominates, and the transfer of a product is incidental, the transaction is not a sale and no implied warranty attaches.10
Although Perlmutterhas been widely followed, 1 recent decisions indicate

fessional buyer examining a product in his field will be held to have assumed the risk
as to all defects which a professional in the field ought to observe, while a nonprofessional buyer will be held to have assumed the risk only for such defects as a layman
might be expected to observe.
Id. § 2-316(3)(b), Comment 8. See, e.g., Chaq Oil Co. v. Gardner Mach. Corp., 500 S.W.2d
877, 878-79 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ) (no recovery under implied
warranty because defects were apparent to buyer); Davis Motors, Dodge and Plymouth Co.
v. Avett, 294 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1956, no writ) (where defect was
concealed, buyer's inspection would not limit implication of warranty); Swift & Co. v. Roberson, 288 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1956, no writ) (where party has
opportunity to inspect, and defects are patent, no implied warranty attaches in absence of
fraud).
16. See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Kennerly, 400 A.2d 850, 852 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1979) (no implied warranty attaches to engineer's product in preparing construction
specifications); Milau Assocs. v. North Ave. Dev., 368 N.E.2d 1247, 1250-51; 42 N.Y.S.2d
482, 485 (1977) (provider of service not held to implied warranty when underground pipe
burst); Gordon v. Holt, 412 N.Y.S.2d 534, 537 (App. Div. 1979) (no implied warranty attaches to architectural service because there is no sale of a product). But see U.C.C. § 2-313,
Comment 2 (1952 version) (recognizing warranties need not be confined to sales contracts).
17. See, e.g., Raritan Trucking Corp. v. Aero Commander Inc., 458 F.2d 1106, 1114-15
(3d Cir. 1972) (airplane servicer not held to implied warranty or strict liability); Lemley v. J
& B Tire Co., 426 F. Supp. 1378, 1379 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (no recovery from repairman of
brakes on theory of implied warranty); Aegis Prod., Inc. v. Arriflex Corp., 268 N.Y.S.2d 185,
187 (Ct. App. 1966) (implied warranty does not attach to performance of service).
18. 123 N.E.2d 792, 140 N.Y.S.2d 54 (App. Div. 1954).
19. Id. at 793, 140 N.Y.S.2d at 55.
20. Id. at 795, 140 N.Y.S.2d at 56. The court stated: "The essence of the contractual
relationship between hospital and patient is readily apparent; the patient bargains for, and
the hospital agrees to make available, the human skill and physical material of medical
science to the end that the patient's health be restored. Such a contract is clearly one for
services, and just as clearly, it is not divisible." Id. at 795, 140 N.Y.S.2d at 56; accord,
Whitehurst v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 402 P.2d 584, 586 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965) (furnishing
of blood by blood bank not a sale to which implied warranty could apply); Balkowitsch v.
Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 132 N.W.2d 805, 810-11 (Minn. 1965) (furnishing blood is the nature of service).
21. See, e.g., Lovett v. Emory Univ., Inc., 156 S.E.2d 923, 924-25 (Ga. 1967) (blood
transfusion incidental part of service furnished by hospital and not a sale); Balkowitsch v.
Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 132 N.W.2d 805, 810 (Minn. 1965) (furnishing
blood a service; not actionable under UCC); Moore v. Underwood Memorial Hosp., 371 A.2d
105, 107 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (blood unavoidably unsafe product, therefore, no
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a trend toward increased recognition
of an implied warranty in certain
22
service-oriented transactions.
Courts which refuse to apply theories of strict liability or implied warranty to medical professionals have done so even when defective products
were provided during the treatment of the patient.2 s The rationale employed to support this determination is that the essence of the relationship between the physician and patient is the provision of professional
services to treat the patient's ailment.24 The business of the medical pro-

cause of action under strict liability or implied warranty). But see, e.g., Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 579 P.2d 1158, 1159 (Colo. 1978) (blood bank providing blood is
a sale of product to which implied warranty attaches); Community Blood Bank, Inc., v.
Russell, 196 So.2d 115, 117 (Fla. 1967) (sale of contaminated blood stated a cause of action);
Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So.2d 205, 208 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (implied warranty imposed on
blood bank for "sale" of blood). Several jurisdictions have extended the sales-service distinction to transactions other than blood. See, e.g., Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 355 F.
Supp. 1065, 1067 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (medical and professional service exempt from strict liability); Airco Refrigeration Service, Inc. v. Fink, 134 So.2d 880, 883 (La. 1961) (contract for
installation of air conditioner not a sale); Aegis Prods., Inc. v. Arriflex Corp., 268 N.Y.S.2d
185, 187 (App. Div. 1966) (repair of movie camera is service).
22. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of America v. Electro Flo Corp., 451 F.2d 1115, 1118 (10th
Cir. 1971) (transaction involving engineering and design aspects was, in essence, a sale);
Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 196 N.W.2d 316, 317-18 (Mich. Ct. App.
1972) (implied warranty of fitness and merchantability apply in sale of electrical service);
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing and Rental Service, 212 A.2d 769, 777-78 (N.J. 1965) (lessor of defective truck liable for breach of implied warranty). The extension of implied warranties to service transactions is not discouraged by the UCC. Comment 2 to section 2-313
of the UCC does not limit the application of warranties to either sales contracts or to the
direct parties to such a contract, and suggests that the Code be used as a guideline for
dealing with future cases. U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 2. A New Jersey court reasoned that the
application of a permanent wave lotion by a beauty parlor attendant amounted to the sale
of a product rather than the rendition of a service. Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 246 A.2d 11,
17 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 1968).
23. See, e.g., Vergott v. Deseret Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., 463 F.2d 12, 16 (5th Cir.
1972) (hospital not liable for breach of implied warranty when defective intracath needle
caused catheter to break off in patient's vein); Barbee v. Rodgers, 425 S.W.2d 342, 346 (Tex.
1968) (strict liability not applicable to prescription, fitting, or sale of contact lenses, absent
claim lenses were defective); Shivers v. Good Shepard Hosp., Inc., 427 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (hospital not liable for injuries caused by negligent
injection of contaminated drug). This rule has also been followed in cases involving prescriptions of defective or contaminated drugs. See, e.g., Carmichael v. Reitz, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381,
393 (Ct. App. 1971) (no liability on medical doctor prescribing drug as treatment); Bichler v.
Willing, 397 N.Y.S.2d 57, 58-59 (App. Div. 1977) (druggist not held to implied warranty for
drug sold); Batiste v. American Home Prods. Corp., 231 S.E.2d 269, 273 (N.C. 1977) (doctor
not a seller to which implied warranty could apply when oral contraceptive is prescribed).
See also, McCoy v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Medical Educ. and Licensure, 391 A.2d 723, 730
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978) (Crumlish, J., dissenting) (increased insurance rates to provide protection against liability upon medical professional results in increased medical costs).
24. See, e.g., Dorney v. Harris, 482 F. Supp. 323, 324 (D. Colo. 1980) (essence of rela-
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fession, therefore, is not viewed as introducing products into the stream
of commerce or promoting their sale.2 5
In Texas, breach of an express or implied warranty creates a potential
violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection
Act (the Act).2 6 The Act is primarily intended to eliminate "false, misleading and deceptive business practices" and "breaches of warranty. 2 7 A
Texas consumer may maintain an action for breach of an express or implied warranty under the Act when the breach constitutes a producing
cause of actual damages.2 8 If a consumer prevails in his action, he is enti-

tionship between physician and patient is providing services); Magrine v. Krasnica, 227 A.2d
539, 543 (N.J. Hudson County Ct. 1967) (essence of relationship between doctor and patient
is doctor offers professional service and skill), aff'd sub nom., Magrine v. Spector, 241 A.2d
637, 638 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968), afl'd, 250 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1969) (per curiam); Potts
v. W. Q. Richards Memorial Hosp., 558 S.W.2d 939, 946 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no
writ) (essence of hospital stay is to furnish services including incidental sales of medicines).
25. See, e.g., Carmichael v. Reitz, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381, 393 (Ct. App. 1971) (physician
prescribes drug only to achieve a cure and he is not in the business of selling a product);
Magrine v. Krasnica, 227 A.2d 539, 543 (N.J. Hudson County Ct. 1967) (professional offers a
service, and is not in the business of selling or supplying products), aff'd sub. nom., Magrine
v. Spector, 241 A.2d 637, 638 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968), aff'd, 250 A.2d 129 (N.J.
1969) (per curiam); Batiste v. American Home Prods. Corp., 231 S.E.2d 269, 273 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1977) (doctor not a seller and breach of implied warranty could not apply). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated that it would be unfair to require
the professional "to trace the article they used along the channels of trade to the original
manufacturer and there to pinpoint an act of negligence remote from their knowledge and
even from their ability to inquire." La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 942 (3d
Cir. 1968). Additionally, the reasonable expectation of the user is that the professional will
provide competent and cautious service, and the user generally does not rely on the professional to guarantee the quality or condition of any product incidentally used in the performance of the professional service. Cf. id. at 943 (one cannot expect infallibility from a professional, only reasonable care); Gagne v. Bertran, 275 P.2d 15, 20 (Cal. 1954) (no strict
liability of warranty imposed because professional offers service, not product in a guaranteed condition).
26. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). See, e.g.,
Holifield v. Coronado Bldg., Inc., 594 S.W.id 214, 216 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houstbn [14th
Dist.] 1980, no writ) (consumer eligible to bring suit under DTPA because of breach of
implied warranty of new home); Young v. DeGuerin, 591 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ) (recovery available under Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act if consumer proves breach of implied warranty in construction of home);
Bunting v. Fodor, 586 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston[lst Dist.] 1979, no writ)
(action lies for breach of warranty under DTPA).
27. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). This section "shall
be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes, which are to protect
consumers against false, misleading, and deceptive business practices, unconscionable actions, and breaches of warranty and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure
such protection." Id.. See United Postage Corp. v. Kammeyer, 581 S.W.2d 716, 723 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
28. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). See Young v.
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tied to recover court costs, attorney's fees, and treble damages. 0
In Providence Hospital v. Truly, s" the Waco Court of Civil Appeals
considered the question of applying section 17.50 of the Act to a medical
transaction. The court relied on several facts in support of its conclusion
that the hospital "sold" the drug Miochol to Mrs. Truly. First, Truly anticipated Providence Hospital would furnish whatever drugs and supplies
were necessary.31 Second, Truly expected to pay the hospital for those
items or supplies furnished by the hospital.32 Third, the hospital charged
Truly for the drug.3" The court rejected the hospital's contention that it
was not liable for breach of an implied warranty merely because it was a
"health-care provider of medical services. 3 4 Additionally, the court determined that section 2.315 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code
imposes an implied warranty of fitness on goods sold for a particular purpose,"5 unless the warranty is excluded or modified under section 2.316.36
Ultimately, insofar as section 2.316 does not exclude the furnishing of
drugs from implied warranties, the court held an implied warranty
37
existed.

DeGuerin, 591 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ) (sufficient for recovery if buyers prove implied warranty, breach thereof, and that such breach
was proximate cause of damages).
29. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1), (c) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). Texas
courts have held treble damages mandatory when the consumer establishes the necessary
elements of a breach. See, e.g., Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 671-72 (Tex. 1977)
(treble damages mandatory to purchasers of home alleging defective sewer system and
faulty repair work); Staley v. Terns Serv. Co., 595 S.W.2d 882, 884 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1980, writ dism'd) (intent by sellers of collection agency to defraud buyers to contract sufficient to award treble damages); Longoria v. Atlantic Gulf Enterprises, Inc., 572 S.W.2d 71,
76 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (homeowner could recover treble
damages if establish necessary elements). But see Spradling v. Williams, 553 S.W.2d 143,
146 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977), aff'd, 566 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1978) (word "may" in §
17.50(b)(1) suggests treble damages are not mandatory, but trier of fact "may" award damages up to treble damages).
30. 611 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ dism'd).
31. Id. at 131.
32. Id. at 131.
33. Id. at 131.
34. Id. at 131. In rejecting the hospital's contention, the court relied on section
2.103(a)(4) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code which provides that a "seller" is a
"person who sells or contracts to sell goods." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.103(a)(4)
(Vernon 1968). The court also relied on section 2.106(a) which provides that "a 'sale' consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price .... " Id. § 2.106(a). The
court concluded that Providence Hospital was a "seller" of goods, and that a sale of the
Miochol had transpired. Providence Hospital v. Truly, 611 S.W.2d 127, 131 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1980, writ dism'd).
35. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.315 (Vernon 1968),
36. Id. § 2.316.
37. Id. § 2 .316(e). Section 2 .316(e) provides:
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The court in Providence Hospital departed from the traditional salesservice distinction regarding application of warranties by extending implied warranties of merchantability and fitness to what were previously
considered service transactions."8 Although such an approach provides increased consumer protection, it has the impractical effect of forcing the
doctor and the hospital to insure the services and products they provide
in the treatment of the patient. " Hospitals or medical professionals are
not in the business of supplying or selling a product commercially,' 0 and,
consequently, are not in a superior position to discover latent defects in
the product employed in administering treatment.' This inability to discover hidden defects will prevent the hospital or doctor from exercising
the control necessary to guarantee the quality of the product."' Additionally, because medical professionals are not in the business of selling products commercially, it will be extremely difficult for the hospital or doctor
to exert the amount of pressure required to force the manufacturer to

The implied warranties of merchantability and fitness shall not be applicable to
the furnishing of human blood, blood plasma, or other human tissue or organs from a
blood bank or reservoir of such other tissues or organs. Such blood, blood plasma or
tissue or organs shall not for the purpose of this title be considered commodities
subject to sale or barter, but shall be considered as medical services.
Id. § 2.316(e).
38. See Providence Hospital v. Truly, 611 S.W.2d 127, 132-33 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1980, writ dism'd). Compare Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 196 N.W.2d
316, 317 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (implied warranties should apply to sale of services as well as
sale of goods) with Batiste v. American Home Prod. Corp., 231 S.E.2d 269, 273 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1977) (individual furnishing professional service not liable in absence of negligence or
intentional conduct).
39. See Carmichael v. Reitz, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381, 393 (Ct. App. 1971) (physician
prescribes medicine only as chemical aid to achieve a cure, and is normally not selling either
product or insurance); Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792, 795, 140 N.Y.S.2d
54, 56 (Ct. App. 1954) (if supplying blood were sale, hospital held responsible as insurer if
injuries resulted from bad blood). Cf. Gagne v. Bertran, 275 P.2d 15, 20-21 (Cal. 1954)
(those who hire experts can expect only reasonable care and competence; they purchase
service, not insurance).
40. See, e.g., Carmichael v. Reitz, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381, 393 (Ct. App. 1971) (doctor not in
business of selling products); Cutler v. General Elec. Co., 4 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 300, 301 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1967) (neither doctor nor hospital in business of selling surgical appliances); Batiste
v. American Home Prod. Corp., 231 S.E.2d 269, 273 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977) (doctor not a seller
to which breach of implied warranty could apply).
41. See Magrine v. Krasnica, 227 A.2d 539, 543 (N.J. Hudson County Ct. 1967) (medical professional generally in no better position than patient to discover defects), af['d sub
nom., Magrine v. Spector, 241 A.2d 637 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968), aff'd, 250 A.2d 129
(N.J. 1969) (per curiam).
42. See Sales & Purdue, The Law of Strict Tort Liability in Texas, 14 Hous. L. REv. 1,
116 (1977). Cf. La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 942-43 (3d Cir. 1968) (difficult for the professional to trace the article to original manufacturer and pinpoint exact act
of negligence).
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improve the quality of the product.4

Under Providence Hospital, hospitals and medical professionals will
be subjected to liability as any other seller of goods who breaches an implied warranty."" Such liability requires the hospital and doctor to provide an allowance in their fee for potential damages and increased insurance rates, raising the cost of medical care. 4" These extra costs will
ultimately fall on the consumer-patient desiring medical treatment."'
Moreover, increased liability will burden new practitioners who lack both
the financial resources to meet the higher insurance premiums and the
47
clientele able to sustain higher medical costs.
The Waco Court of Civil Appeals in Providence Hospital has assumed

the vanguard of the current trend holding hospitals liable for injuries
caused by defective drugs administered for the purpose of treating patients. Such a view will force hospitals and physicians to meet the unduly

43. See Sales & Purdue, The Law of Strict Tort Liability in Texas, 14 Hous. L. REV. 1,
116 (1977). Cf. Johnson v. William C. Ellis & Sons Iron Works, Inc., 604 F.2d 950, 956 (5th
Cir. 1979) (imposing duty on provider of services to discover defects in products used requires them to examine products and pass on cost of additional service not ordered by consumer); La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 942 (3d Cir. 1968) (unfair to require
provider of professional service to trace article used to original manufacturer and pinpoint
act of negligence remote from their knowledge and ability to inquire); Nath v. National
Equip. Leasing Corp., 422 A.2d 868, 876 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (whether imposing liability on
finance lessor would indirectly cause manufacturers to improve the quality of their product
is at best speculative).
44. Compare Providence Hospital v. Truly, 611 S.W.2d 127, 133 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1980, writ dism'd) (hospital held to implied warranty for sale of drug used during operation)
with Barfield v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 110 N.E.2d 103, 104 (Mass. 1953) (food which caused
poisoning carried implied warranty of fitness) and Sneed v. Beaverson, 395 P.2d 414, 415-16
(Okla. 1964) (food sold carries implied warranty of wholesomeness) and F. W. Woolworth
Co. v. Garza, 390 S.W.2d 90, 91 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1956, writ refd n.r.e.) (food
sold for human consumption held to implied warranty). Professionals are generally held
only to a negligence standard. See Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service Transactions-Implied Warranty and Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 661, 669-70. Cf.
La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 943 (3d Cir. 1968) (claim of liability is no
more than claim of negligence in failing to perform services with due care).
45. See Magrine v. Krasnica, 227 A.2d 539, 545 (N.J. Hudson County Ct. 1967)
(purchase of insurance to protect doctor from damages would unduly increase medical costs
to the patient), aff'd sub nom., Magrine v. Spector, 241 A.2d 637 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1968), aff'd, 250 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1969) (per curiam); Hoven v. Kelble, 256 N.W.2d 379, 391-92
(Wis. 1977) (imposing liability on medical transaction would unduly interfere with availability of essential medical care).
46. See McCoy v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Medical Educ. and Licensure, 391 A.2d 723,
730 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978) (Crumlish, J., dissenting); Sales, The Service-Sales Transaction:
A Citadel Under Assault, 10 ST. MARY's L. J. 13, 25 (1978).
47. Cf. McCoy v. Commonwealth, Bd. of Medical Educ. and Licensure, 391 A.2d 723,
730 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978) (Crumlish, J., dissenting) (insurance act which raises premiums
unduly prohibitive to new practitioners).
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burdensome task of insuring the quality of the products they dispense. As
a result, medical costs will increase and the availability of essential medi48
cal care will be become severely limited.
James D. Shields

48. See Hoven v. Kelble, 256 N.W.2d 379, 391-92 (Wis. 1977).
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